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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDGARDO MENDOZA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950337-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1995), whereby a criminal
defendant may take an interlocutory appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final order for anything other than a conviction
for a first degree or capital felony.

The Order granting the

petition for interlocutory review is contained in Addendum A.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of relevant statutes and constitutional
provisions is contained in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995)
Amendment V to the U.S. Constitution

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Do the imposition of a fine and punitive isolation by the
Utah Department of Corrections at a disciplinary hearing
constitute "punishment," thereby precluding the State under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution from pursuing criminal prosecution and

punishment against Appellant Edgardo Mendoza ("Mendoza" or
"Appellant") for the same offense?
STANDARD OR REVIEW: This issue involves a
question of law which this Court reviews for
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah
1994); State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah
App. 1995) (cert, granted).

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
On February 27, 1995, Mendoza filed a Motion to Dismiss
the charge against him on the grounds that he is being subjected
to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

R. 21-30.

contained in Addendum C.

A copy of that motion is

Following a hearing, the trial court

denied Mendoza's motion on May 8, 1995.

R. 61.

Mendoza filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order with this Court on May 25, 1995.
A copy of that petition is contained in Addendum D.

R. 76-87.
This Court

granted Mendoza's petition for interlocutory review on June 22,
1995.

R. 74.

See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated August 15, 1994, the State
charged Mendoza with one count of Assault on a Correctional
Officer, a class A misdemeanor.

R. 1-2.

On February 27, 1995, Mendoza filed a Motion to Dismiss
the charge against him on the grounds that he is being subjected

2

to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.

R. 21-30.

See Addendum C.

Mendoza also filed a "Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss."

A copy of that memorandum is contained in Addendum C.

On March 6, 1995, the State filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Mendoza7s Motion to Dismiss.

R. 31-44.

On

March 10, 1995, the State filed an Affidavit of Terry Bartlett,
Director of Institutional Operations at the Utah Department of
Corrections, and the Utah Department of Corrections filed a
"Memorandum Re: Double Jeopardy."

R. 45-47, 48-52.

On March 13, 1995, the trial court held a hearing on
Mendoza 7 s Motion to Dismiss.

R. 102-151.

On May 8, 1995, the

trial court signed a written Order denying Mendoza7s motion
(R. 61) and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
R. 58-60.

A copy of the Order with Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum E.
Mendoza filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order with this Court on May 25, 1995.

R. 76-87.

This Court issued its Order granting interlocutory review on
June 22, 1995.

R. 74.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 7, 1994, Mendoza allegedly assaulted a
correctional officer at the Utah State Prison with bodily fluids.
R. 1, 22, 48, 59, 85.

The Department of Corrections held a
3

disciplinary hearing and, based on the conduct charged in the
present case, thereafter sentenced Mendoza to pay a $200 fine and
serve thirty days in punitive isolation.

R. 22, 48, 59, 85.

On August 15, 1994, after the disciplinary hearing, the
State filed the Information in the present case, charging Mendoza
with one count of Assault on a Correctional Officer, a class A
misdemeanor, arising out of the same alleged assault of August 7,
1994.

R. 1-2, 59, 85.
The trial judge denied Mendoza7s Motion to Dismiss and

entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

See Addendum E.

The trial judge concluded that the fine and isolation imposed in
this case were not "punitive" and that Mendoza's protection
against double jeopardy was not violated.

R. 60.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mendoza's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection
against double jeopardy was violated in this case where he was
punished for the same behavior in a prison disciplinary
proceeding prior to the filing of criminal charges.

The State

agreed that the disciplinary proceeding was a "separate
proceeding" under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The fine imposed

on Mendoza was "punitive," thereby triggering double jeopardy
protection.

Under the Halper1 /Austin2 test, the fine was

1

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104
L.Ed.2d 487 (1989).
2

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
L.Ed.2d 488 (1993).
4

, 113 S.Ct.

, 125

imposed for retributive and deterrent reasons; since it was not
solely remedial, it implicated double jeopardy protection.

Under

the more general Arbon3 totality of the circumstances test, the
fine also was punitive.

Because Mendoza was punished in a

separate proceeding prior to the filing of criminal charges, the
trial court erred in denying Mendoza's Motion to Dismiss.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE FINE IMPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AT A SEPARATE PROCEEDING WAS
"PUNITIVE"; MENDOZA'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS VIOLATED BY THIS
SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL PROCEEDING BASED ON THE SAME
CONDUCT.
The double jeopardy clause protects against three forms
of abuse:

(1) "a second prosecution for the same offense after

acquittal", (2) "a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction", and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense."
Halper, 490 U.S. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 at
(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct.
2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)); see also State v. Davis, 903 P.2d
940, 943 (Utah App. 1995), cert, granted March, 1996; Utah Code
Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995).

The third area of abuse--whether

Mendoza was subjected to multiple punishments for the same
offense--is at issue in this case.

See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440;

Davis, 903 P.2d at 943.
As the Court emphasized in Halper, the protection against
3

denied,

State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d
P.2d
(1996).
5

1270

(Utah App. 1996), cert,

multiple punishments for the same offense "has deep roots in our
history and jurisprudence."

Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.

In Halper,

the Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not
be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that
the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution."

Halper, 490 U.S. at

448-49.
In Halper, after the defendant was convicted for filing
false Medicare claims, the government brought a civil action
which would have resulted in Halper paying $130,000 for 65 acts
of filing false claims.

Halper, 490 U.S. at 435.

The Halper

Court considered whether the sanction was remedial in nature and
therefore did not trigger double jeopardy protection, or punitive
in nature, thereby triggering the protection.

As the Court

pointed out, "punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and
deterrence."

Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.

"'Retribution and

deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives.'"

Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539,

n.20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)).

The Court concluded

that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment
as we have come to understand the term,
[citation omitted.] We therefore hold under the
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already
has been punished in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction
to the extent that the second sanction may not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution.
6

Id. at 448-49.
Following Halper, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated the Halper analysis in determining whether a sanction
is punitive in the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines context.

See

Austin, 509 U.S. at 609, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at 505
(citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48).

The Court concluded that

forfeiture does not "serve [] a solely remedial purpose" and was
therefore punitive in nature.
at 2812.

Austin, 509 U.S. at 622, 113 S.Ct.

The Court again followed Halper and Department of

Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,

U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d

767 (1994), and held that a tax was punitive in nature and
therefore subject to double jeopardy claims.

Kurth Ranch, 114

S.Ct. at 1948.
Although Halper dealt with a situation where the criminal
sanction preceded the civil sanction, various courts have applied
Halper in situations where a punitive civil sanction was applied
prior to a criminal sanction.

See e.g. United States v. Hudson,

14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. SanchezEscareno, 950 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1991), cert, denied,
U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); United States v.

Mavers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S.
865, 111 S.Ct. 178, 112 L.Ed.2d 142 (1990).
In Davis, 903 P.2d at 946, this Court applied the
Austin/Halper analysis as to whether a sanction is punitive and
therefore triggers double jeopardy protection in the forfeiture
context.

This Court pointed out that the "solely remedial
7

purpose" language which was "underscored in Austin" clarifies
that the Austin/Halper test applies in determining whether a
sanction is punitive, and "even if a statute is remedial in part,
if it has any punitive attributes, constitutional protections
attach."

Id. (citing Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812).

This Court

held that the forfeiture statute at issue was not solely
remedial, but was punitive in nature, and that double jeopardy
protection therefore applied and barred a subsequent criminal
proceeding.

Davis, 903 P.2d at 948, 950; see also State v. a

House and 1.3 Acres, 886 P.2d 534, 540-41 (Utah 1994) (forfeiture
is punitive and therefore Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth
Amendment applies).

The focus in determining whether a sanction

is punitive is "on whether 'the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment.'"

Davis, 903

P.2d at 949 (quoting Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 n.14).

The

question of whether the sanction is disproportionate to the
government's costs in prosecution is irrelevant.

Davis, 903 P.2d

at 949-50.
Following this Court's decision in Davis, the United
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct.
2135 (1996), that "in rem civil forfeitures are neither
"punishment" nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."

Id. at 214 9.

The Court reasoned that an in rem

forfeiture is distinguishable from an in personam fine and that
historically, in rem proceedings have not constituted punishment.
The Court distinguished Halper by emphasizing that Halper
8

involved a civil penalty rather than a civil forfeiture; Ursery
focused on the historical distinction between civil forfeiture
and civil penalties, rejecting the Halper rule only in the
context of civil forfeitures.

Because the instant case does not

involve a civil forfeiture, the Ursery analysis does not apply.
In State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996), this
Court held that a driver's license revocation is not "punitive"
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Id. at 1270.

This Court

determined that "in the context of an administrative license
suspension," the Halper/Austin analysis is not strictly applied.
Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1272.

Instead, this Court "perform[ed]

x

a

particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes
that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.'"

Id. at 272

(quoting Davis, 903 P.2d at 947 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448,
109 S.Ct. at 1901)).

This Court "focus[ed] on xno single "key"

factor,' . . . recognizing that 'the specific analysis that
applies to determine whether a sanction constitutes punishment
within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause varies depending
upon the sanction.'"

Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1272 (quoting Baldwin v.

Department of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1630, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 422, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Kurth Ranch, 114
S.Ct. at 1946)) .
In determining whether driver license revocation
proceedings are punitive, the Arbon Court considered:
(1) whether the purposes of "past uses of license suspensions"
had been punitive or nonpunitive; and (2) "the overall purpose
9

and intent" of the statutory scheme.

Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1273.

It concluded that (1) historically license suspension has not
been considered "punitive," and (2) the purpose of the statutory
scheme is to promote public safety, not punish individuals.
at 1272-74.

Id.

This Court held that license suspension is not

punitive and does not therefore trigger double jeopardy
protection.

Id. at 1275.

In this case, the State agreed that the fine imposed on
Mendoza was done so in a separate proceeding prior to the filing
of criminal charges.

R. 122.

Hence, the only issue presented to

this Court is whether the fine was "punitive," thereby triggering
double jeopardy protection.
Pursuant to either the Austin/Halper test or the Arbon
test, the fine imposed on Mendoza was "punitive."
definition punishment.

A fine is by

Webster's Dictionary defines a fine as "a

sum of money paid by way of penalty for an offense; a pecuniary
punishment.

To fine is to subject to a pecuniary penalty for an

offense or breach of law; to punish by fine."

Webster7 s

Dictionary, 2nd Ed., p. 687; see generally People v. McVickers,
840 P.2d 955, 957 (Cal. 1992) ("Commonly understood definitions
of punishment are intuitive:

there is little dispute that

additional jail titne ox extxa. iines axe punis^er^. u ) .
The focus under the Halper/Austin test is whether the
sanction is solely remedial, or whether it has a deterrent or
retributive aspect.

Mendoza does not have a job and any money he

obtains comes from gifts from family and friends.
10

R. 110.

When

someone gives money to Mendoza by placing it on his books at the
prison, the prison automatically takes sixty percent of the
amount.

R. 110. Thereafter, at the end of each month, the

prison takes an additional sixty percent of the amount remaining
on the books.

R. 110-11.

Under these circumstances, the $200

fine is an extraordinary amount which precludes an individual
from obtaining items from the commissary until paid.
inmates serves a punitive purpose.

Fining

It has both a deterrent and

retributive effect where prisoners have been subjected to prison
discipline.

It alters the original sentence being served by the

individual.

Accordingly, it is not solely remedial and is

"punitive" under the Halper/Austin test.
This fine is also "punitive" under the more general Arbon
analysis.

Under the totality of circumstances, the fine is

excessive and punitive in nature. As previously outlined, $200
is a tremendous amount of money in a prison context.

Mendoza has

no source of income.

Such a fine severely restricts his access

to commissary items.

The fine has little to do with the orderly

operation of the prison.
Historically, although prisons have applied various
disciplinary sanctions in an effort to maintain order and
discipline, fines rarely are discussed.

See, e.g., United States

v. Newbv, 11 F.3d 1143 (3rd Cir. 1993).

Instead, loss of good

time and loss of privileges are often used as disciplinary
measures.

See, e.g., Id. at 1144.

While prison officials are given deference on prison
11

matters which affect safety, security and discipline (see Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447
(1979)), the fine in this case was not directly related to prison
safety or discipline.

Instead, it was a distinct punishment

which should be viewed as punitive and outside the areas of
prison deference.

Unlike other prison disciplinary measures, a

fine alters and adds to the sentence an individual is serving.
It therefore is distinct from removal of good time credit or
other similar disciplinary measures.

The effect of such a fine

is punitive in nature, thereby triggering the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

Mendoza's right to be free from double jeopardy was

violated in this case where he was initially punished pursuant to
prison disciplinary procedures and the criminal charges
subsequently were filed in this case.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Mendoza respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss and
remand this case to the trial court for dismissal.
SUBMITTED this

^6t

day of November, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JANET MILLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
12

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102; two copies to Blake Nakamura, Deputy District Attorney,
2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190; and one copy
to Frank D. Mylar, Assistant Attorney General, Heber M. Wells
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this

#&,

day of November, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this

day of November, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS^T/lfAtO^^

ooooo

V$ W$

/

COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 950337-CA
v.
Edgardo Mendoza,

ftffOOOSgtf

Defendant and Petitioner.

This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time required,
for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 5(e).
Dated this^j^7 day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

James Z. Davis,
Associate Presiding Judge

y7f3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of June, 1995, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a
personal representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be
delivered to the parties listed below:
Janet Miller
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys at Law
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the parties listed below:
Salt Lake District Attorney
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
The Honorable Roger A. Livingston
Third Circuit Court
210 West 10000 South
Sandy, UT 84070
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1995.

By

tm.<& <
Deputy Clerk

L

L(\(

Third Circuit, Sandy
Department #941000329 MS

ADDENDUM B

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) l b receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) Tb testify in his own behalf;
(d) l b be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) l b have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) l b a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) l b the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) l b be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

ADDENDUM C
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JANET MILLER 6410
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc
Attorney for Defendant
424 E. 500 S. Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTTJATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
Plaintiff,

•

Notion To Dismiss

]
J
])

EDGARDO MENDOZA

Case No. 941000329 MS
Judge Livingston

Defendant

Comes now the Defendant, EDGARDO MENDOZA, by and through counsel of record, JANET MILLER, and moves this Court to
dismiss the charges on the grounds that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy precludes criminal prosecution and
punishment where defendant has previousiy been punished folbwing a disciplinary hearing for the same offense, see Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; State v. Miller. 747 P i d 440 (Utah Ct App. 1987); United States v. Halper. 490 U i . 435,104 L i d i d . 487 (1989).
Defendant respectfully submits the following memorandum of law in support of his motion to dismiss.

JANET MILLER 6410
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc
Attorney for Defendant
424 E. 500 S. Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion To Dismiss

)

v.

)

EDGARDO MENDOZA,

)

Case No. 941000329 MS

Judge Livingston
Defendant

)

FAQS
Defendant has been charged by Information with Assault on a Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, at the Utah
State Prison, occurring on or about August 7,1994. Prior to the filing of the criminal charge, a disciplinary hearing on the matter was
held at the Utah State Prison. Case No. 394-08091.' After finding Defendant guilty of Assault with Body Fluid at the disciplinary
hearing, the Utah Department of Corrections sentenced Defendant to a $ 200.00 fine and 30 days punitive isolation.

1

Defendant has twice subpoenaed but has not received records from the disciplinary hearing, see Addendum A. Further facts
contained in this memorandum regarding the disciplinary hearing were obtained solely from Defendant

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROHIBITS THE STATE FROH PROSECUTING DEFENDANT
TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States and the Utah Constitutions protects against three separate abuses by
prohibiting: ( I ) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after convictions;
and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Miller. 747 P i d 440,444 (Utah CL App. 1987); United States v. Halper. 490
\iS. 435,440104 LEdJd 487,496 (1989). "Whatever other abuses the Clause prohibits, at its most fundamental level it protects and
accused against repeated attempts to exact one or more punishments for the same offense." United States v. $405.08923 U i . Currency,
etaL,33 F i d 1210,1215 (1994).
Civil sanctions which are punitive in nature constitute "punishment" for the purpose of analyzing the Double Jeopardy Clause's
prohibition against multiple punishments. Halper. 490 U i . at 447-48. The constitutional protection against multiple punishment is
"intrinsically personal." Id. at 447. Its violation can be identified only be assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the
individual by the machinery of the state." Id. Labeling a proceeding "civil" or "administrative" does not suffice for the purposes of Double
Jeopardy analysis. Id. at 448. "[I]n determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes
actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding givingriseto the sanction, that must be
evaluated." Jd. at 447, n. 7. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment Jd. at 448.
The traditional goals of punishment are retribution and deterrence. Id. "Furthermore, 'retribution and deterrence are not
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.'" Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U i . 520,539 n. 20; 60 LEdJd 447 (1979) (federal
jail's search policies, double-bunking and restrictions on packages and books not "punishment" in violation of pretrial detainee's
constitutional rights).
In Halper. the federal government prosecuted Halper for filing false Medicare claims. He was convicted and sentenced in a
criminal proceeding. Subsequently, the federal government sued Halper under the False Claim Act demanding over $130,000.00 in civil

sanctions when its actual loss amounted to $585.00. jd. at 437-38. Because the civil sanction was so disproportionate to the
government's actual loss, it could not fairly be characterized as remedial. The Court held that the civil sanction constituted "punishment"
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee against imposing multiple punishments.
A.

Sanctions imposed upon Defendant following the disciplinary hearing constitute punishment under the double jeopardy clause
and preclude subsequent criminal prosecution for the same underlying offense.

Dismissal is proper in the case at bar. The disciplinary hearing and the pending criminal charges constitute two separate
proceedings. The pursuit of the criminal prosecution of this case, forces Defendant to marshal a defense against precisely the same
conduct adjudicated in the prison disciplinary action. There can be Tittle doubt that this is just the type of action the Double Jeopardy
Clause seeks to protect
Dismissal is proper also on the grounds that the sanctions imposed on Defendant following the disciplinary hearing constitute
"punishment". The imposition of the $200.00 fine and 30 day punitive isolation following the disciplinary hearing only serves the goals
of retribution and deterrence triggering Fifth Amendment protection; neither sanctions is solely remedial.
A fine is by definition punishment Webster's defines a fine as "a sum of money paid by way of penalty for an offense; a
pecuniary punishment To fine, is to subject to a pecuniary penalty for an offense or breach of law; to punish by fine.7 Historically, fines
were imposed as a form of retribution.
In Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 841 P2d 6,11-13 (Utah 1992), the court held that civil proceedings under the Illegal Drug
Stamp Tax Act were quasi-criminal in nature because by imposing a substantial tax the statute sought to punish and deter those aught
with drugs.
Money taken from the books of prisoners goes to the prison's general fund. It is not used to directly compensate the victim for
his or her losses. The amount imposed does not reflect an assessment of any monetary losses suffered by the prison or victim. Indeed, the
amount imposed appears to reflect the prison board's assessment of the seriousness of the prisoner's conduct

2

Webster's Dictionary, 2nd Ed. Unabridged pg. 687.

Haloed progeny shed light on this issue.
In Austin v. United States, 113 S.Q. 2801,12S LEdid 488 (1993), the Supreme Court relied on the holding in Halper stating
that a civil sanction a n count as punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes. (Civil drug forfeiture counts as "punishment" for purposes of
Excessive Fines Clause). In United States v. $405,08923 U i . Currency, 33 F3d 1210.1216 (1994), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Austin and held that a civil forfeiture action based on the same offense as a
criminal charge could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In $40508923, the federal government sought forfeiture of property pursuant to federal statutes governing forfeiture of
proceeds of illegal narcotks transactions and of money involved in money laundering transactions of three defendants subsequent to their
convictions on drug conspiracy and money laundering charges. The Court found the Fifth Amendment violated, reasoning that the civil
forfeiture action and the defendant's criminal prosecution constituted separate proceedings. The Court reasoned further that the
forfeiture statutes do not serve a purely remedial purpose but rather serve retributive or deterrent purposes and thus constitute
"punishment", triggering Fifth Amendment protections. 33 Fid at 1218.
This issue was most recently addressed by the U i . District Court for the District of Oregon in United Stated v. Stanwood. DC
Ore, Civil No. 94-1333-JO, (12/16/94). In Stanwood. the government commenced civil forfeiture proceedings against real estate upon
which the defendant had been growing marijuana soon after the defendant's indictment for that offense. The defendant entered into a
settlement agreement on the forfeiture claim. Before final judgment was entered in the forfeiture case, the defendant pleaded guilty in
the criminal case.
The defendant fs double jeopardy challenge came in the form of a collateral attack, forcing the Court to decide whether
$40508923 announced a new constitutional rule which could not be applied retroactively. Relying on the Halper and Austin decisions,
the Court concluded that $405089.23 could be applied to this defendant's case. The Court in Stanwood held that the civil forfeiture case
and the criminal case constituted separate proceedings and that the civil forfeiture case constituted punishment for the purposes of
double jeopardy analysis. However the Court found also that jeopardy attached in Stanwood's criminal case when he entered his guilty

plea on November 25,1991; jeopardy attached in the forfeiture case when final judgments were entered in March, 1992. Based on the
dates jeopardy attached, the Court found that Stanwood's criminal conviction was the first punishment and therefore did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The double jeopardy analysis in Halper was applied to prison disciplinary hearings in People v. Watson, No. 93CA0565,1994
W l 419957 (Colo. Ct App. Aug. I I , 1994). The court in Watson noted that the purpose of prison disciplinary hearings was to maintain
institutional order, jdjrt 2. The court then determined whether the sanctions imposed on Watson were remedial in nature or whether
the constituted "punishment" as defined in Halper. The specific sanctions imposed on Watson were loss of good time credit, transfer, and
segregation. Because the goal of the sanctions was to promote inmate rehabilitation and maintain order, the court held that they did not
constitute punishment triggering double jeopardy analysis.
The Watson court did not address the issue at ban whether imposing a fine and punitory isolation in a prison disciplinary
action constitutes punishment as defined in Halper. This issue has not been directly raised in Utah. InlohnsvShulsen, 717 P2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that parole revocation hearings are administrative proceedings and are therefore civil in
nature. In State v. Mercies, 601 P2d 925,926 (1979), the court held that a defendant who was criminally prosecuted for escape was not
twice put in jeopardy because he was disciplined by the prison board. Menzies is not controlling here. Menzies was decided a decade
before the United States Supreme Court's holding in Halper. the Menzies court did not specifically address the narrow question raised in
Halper and here.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the charges. Defendant's subjection to punishment following the August 24,
1994 prison disciplinary hearing trigger the protection o Fifth Amendment, applicable to the State of Utah through the Fourteenth
Amendment
DATED this ^\

^
day of February, 1995.

miVmUiA

T MILLER

rney for Defendant
HAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt Lake'District Attorney, 2001 Sooth State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84190-1200 this f A day of February, 1995.
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FILED
MAY 2 51995

JANET MILLER 6410
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
424 EAST 500 SOUTH SUITE 3 00
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801)

COURT OF APPEALS

532-5444

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

PETITION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

95-0337-CA

v.
EDGARDO MENDOZA,

Trial Court No. 941000329MS

Defendant/Petitioner
Edgardo Mendoza, through counsel, Janet Miller, petitions
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to permit an appeal from the interlocutory order of
the Honorable Judge Livingston entered in this manner of May 8,
1995.

A copy of the order sought to be reviewed is attached.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Edgardo Mendoza has been charged by Information with Assault
on a Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, at the Utah
State Prison, occurring on or about August 7, 1994.

Prior to the

filing of the criminal charge, a disciplinary hearing on the
matter was held at the prison. After finding Defendant guilty of
Assault with Body Fluid at the disciplinary hearing, the Utah
Department of Corrections sentenced Mr. Mendoza to a $200.00 fine
and 3 0 days punitive isolation.

QUESTION OF LAW
At issue is whether the protection of Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution extend
to a criminal prosecution of a defendant where the defendant has
previously been sanctioned for the same offense after a prison
disciplinary hearing.

More specifically at issue is whether the

$200.00 fine and 30 days punitive isolation assessed against Mr.
Mendoza constitute punishment thereby prohibiting the State from
prosecuting Mendoza in the Circuit Court and subjecting him to
multiple punishments for the same offense.
"The most basic element of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the
protection it affords against successive prosecutions -- that is,
against efforts to impose punishment for the same offense in two
or more separate proceedings."

United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.

Currency. 33 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994).
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892
(1989), the Supreme Court held that where a civil sanction or
fine is not rationally related to a remedial goal of compensating
the government, such a fine is considered "punitive" and hence
subject to the Double Jeopardy prohibition of multiple punishment
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
According to Halper, civil sanctions which are punitive in nature
constitute "punishment" for the purpose of analyzing the Double
Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments. 490
U.S. at 447-48.

Rejecting the government's argument that

"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes occurs only in criminal
2

and not in civil proceedings, the Court stated,

lf

[I]n determining

whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in
question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise
to the sanction, that must be evaluated." Id. at 448.
Thus according to Halper a civil sanction that is not
exclusively remedial, but can also be explained as effecting
retribution or deterrence is punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.

See id.

Accord United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536,

540 (10th Cir. 1994) ("if sanction is not exclusively remedial,
but rather can be explained as affecting deterrence or
retribution, it is punishment for double jeopardy analysis.").
The Supreme Court relied on its holding in Halper in Austin
v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed 2d 499 (1993) stating
that a civil sanction can count as punishment for Double Jeopardy
purposes.

(Civil drug forfeiture counts as "punishment" for

purposes of Excessive Fines Clause) .
Following Halper and Austin, the Court, in Department of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct 1937 (1994) , again
held that imposition of drug tax penalty after a criminal
sanction had been imposed on the Kurths constituted a violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the rule of Halper.

In Kurth

Ranch, the Kurths pleaded guilty to unlawful cultivation of
marijuana and received individual sentences.

While attempting to

discharge their debt in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Montana
taxing authorities, which had imposed the drug tax on the Kurths,
3

filed a claim with the bankruptcy court.

The Kurths challenged

this claim on the ground that the drug tax was not a valid
assessment, having been imposed in violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

the bankruptcy judge as well as the district

court and the appellate court agreed with the Kurths.

See id. at

1938.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with the courts
below that the drug tax was is essence a second punishment:
This drug tax is not the kink of remedial sanction that may follow
the first punishment of a criminal offense.
Instead, it is a
second punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional
protection that has 'deep roots in our history and jurisprudence,'
Halper, 490 U.S. at 44 0, and there fore must be imposed during the
first prosecution or not at all. The proceeding Montana initiated
to collect a tax on the possession of drugs was the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the
Kurths in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense.'
Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1948.
Believing itself bound by United States Supreme Court
precedents, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency* 33 F.3d
1210, 1216 (1994),

held that a civil forfeiture action based on

the same offense as a criminal charge could violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
In $405,089.23, the federal government sought forfeiture of
property pursuant to federal statutes governing forfeiture of
proceeds of illegal narcotics transactions and of money involved
in money laundering charges.

The Court found the Fifth Amendment

violated, reasoning that the civil forfeiture action and the
Defendant's criminal prosecution constituted separate
4

proceedings.

The Court reasoned further that the forfeiture

statutes do not serve a purely remedial purpose, but rather serve
retributive or deterrent purposes and thus constitute
"punishment", triggering Fifth Amendment protection. 33 F.3d at
1218.
Mendoza challenges both the Findings of Fact (specifically
Numbers 4. - 7. , and 9.) and Conclusions of Law contained in the
Interlocutory Order.

The $200.00 fine and 30 days punitive

isolation imposed upon Mendoza following the prison disciplinary
hearing constitute "punishment" under the analysis demanded by
Halper and its progeny.

Further, the specific issue at bar is

one of first impression.
While other courts have considered whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits criminal prosecution for an offense
following prison administrative discipline, none have addressed
the very narrow issue at bar of whether the fine and punitive
isolation constitute "punishment", and many were decided after
Halper and its progeny. See Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150 (7th
Cir. 1994), Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), United States
v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. 1993), United States v. Rising,
867 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1989), United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d
388 (9th Cir. 1969), United States v. Stuckev, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d
Cir.) cert denied 404 U.S. 841 (1971).
In Garrity, the court found that administrative prison
discipline of segregation and extension of the defendant's
release date from prison does not preclude subsequent criminal
5

prosecution. 41 F.3d at 1152. Bell v. Wolfish upheld the
prison's search policies, double-bunking, and restrictions on
packages as permissible nonpunitive objectives. 99 S.Ct. at 1886.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Newby found that
the sanctions of transfer, segregation, and loss of good time
credit survive Double Jeopardy scrutiny. 11 F.3d at 1146.

The

Rising Court found that "administrative punishment" assessed
against the defendant for the murder of another inmate did not
bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense; that
Court, however, did not state specifically of what the
"administrative punishment" consisted.

In 1969, the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Apker found that segregation
from other prisoners following an administrative hearing did not
bar criminal prosecution. 419 F.2d 388. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found similarly in Stuckev finding
that 15 days segregation and subsequent criminal prosecution did
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
ISSUE RAISED IN TRIAL COURT
On February 21, 1995, Mr. Mendoza filed with the Circuit
Court, Sandy Department, a Motion to Dismiss based on Double
Jeopardy to the Defendant.

The Salt Lake District Attorney filed

a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on March 6, 1995. The Utah Attorney
General's Office also filed a Memorandum regarding Double
Jeopardy on March 10, 1995, on behalf of the Utah Department of
Corrections. Counsel from all sides argued the Motion on March
6

13, 1995. The State was represented by District Attorney Neal
Gunnarson, Deputy District Attorney Blake Nakamura and Assistant
Attorney General Frank Mylar.

The Honorable Judge Livingston

took the matter under advisement, denying Mendoza's Motion to
Dismiss on March 20, 1995.

Judge Livingston signed the Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss on May 8, 1995.
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY
Mr. Mendoza's substantial rights are at stake.

By pursuing

criminal prosecution, the State is forcing Mendoza to marshall a
defense in the Third Circuit Court against charges which have
already been adjudicated in a separate proceeding behind prison
walls and for which he has already been punished.
Many inmates at the Utah State Prison, like Mendoza, are
facing criminal prosecution for offenses which have been heard,
resolved, and sentence imposed at a prison disciplinary hearing.
Immediate appeal of this case would effectuate plea bargaining
and case resolution of many other pending matters as well as
those which have yet to have been filed.
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION
Should prosecution continue, Mendoza intends to invoke his
constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Immediate appeal of the

issue at bar, if successful, would terminate this litigation and
would save the taxpayers of the State of Utah a considerable
dollar amount by eliminating the need for a trial by jury.
Further, immediate appeal would quell safety concerns of the
7

State in transporting defense witnesses from the Utah State
Prison to the Third Circuit Court in Sandy.

Mendoza was housed

with many death-row inmates in Uintah Two at the time of the
alleged offense and intends to call several inmates as witnesses
if trial becomes necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l]/\)

day of May, 1995.

/JANET MILLER "
(Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Salt Lake District Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this

day of May, 1995.
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ADDENDUM E

Frank D. Mylar (5116)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
330 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 575-1600
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DIVISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
EDGARDO MENDOZA,

Case No. 941000329 MS

Defendant.

Judge Livingston

This matter comes before this court on Defendant's motion to
dismiss on the grounds that he is being subjected to multiple
punishments in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the
United States and Utah Constitutions.

Specifically Defendant

claims he was "punished" within the meaning of double jeopardy
following an administrative disciplinary hearing at the Utah State
Prison.
was

The Defendant was represented by Janet Miller, the State

represented

by District Attorney Neal Gunnarson#

Deputy

District Attorney Blake Nakamura, and Assistant Attorney General,
Frank D. Mylar, representing the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDC).
After reviewing memoranda submitted by all parties, the
affidavit of Terry Bartlett, Director of Institutional Operations

for the UDC, and hearing oral argument of the parties, the court
now enters the following findings of fact and conclusion of laws:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On about August 7, 1994, Defendant allegedly assaulted a

Utah State Prison correctional officer with bodily fluids.
2.

After an administrative disciplinary hearing at the

prison, Defendant was found in violation of prison rules and fined
$200,00 and restricted to his cell for 30 days.
3.

As a separate and unrelated proceeding, Defendant is

currently being prosecuted in this criminal court for Assault on a
Correctional Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor, arising out of the
same alleged assault of August 7, 1994.
4.

Prison

officials

discipline

inmates

to

assist

in

rehabilitation and to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly managed
institution.
5.

(See Affidavit of Terry Bartlett, 1 2) .

The disciplinary process at the Utah State Prison is

essential to assist prison officials in managing the behavior of
convicted felons by determining whether prison rules are broken.
If rules are broken, the prison uses this information to assess the
inmatefs

security

classification

and

rehabilitative

needs.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 3).
6.

Fines

that

are

assessed

following

a

disciplinary

conviction are no more than $200.00 and go towards reimbursing the
prison the costs of the hearing, including investigation costs when
2

applicable.

Additional monetary amounts may be charged to the

inmate to reimburse the prison for property damage or related
costs.
7.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 4).
Monetary

judgments

and

fines, as well

as punitive

isolation (i.e. restrictions from privileges through confinement in
one's cell), also serve to encourage proper inmate behavior and
rehabilitate the inmate.
8.

(Affidavit of Bartlett, 1 5).

The disciplinary hearing process at the Utah State Prison

is a civil administrative process and not criminal in nature.
9.

The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30

days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not
"grossly disproportionate to the prison's remedial goals."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above findings of fact, the court now enters
the following conclusions of law:
1.

The administrative discipline received by Defendant of 30

days of restriction to his cell and a fine of $200.00 was not
"punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause of the
United States or Utah constitutions.
2.

The

Defendant

is not

being

subjected

to "multiple

punishments."
3.

The Defendant is not being subjected to double jeopardy.
3

ORDER
Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the court now makes the following ORDER:
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

DATED this

i

day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on April 19, 1995, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, an exact copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to:
Janet Miller
Elizabeth Bowman
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake Nakamura
Deputy District Attorney
E. Neal Gunnarson
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
2001 South State Street, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
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